October 14 This Day During World War ll

October 14, 1943 – The second Schweinfurt raid was a World War II air battle that took place over Germany between forces of the United States 8th Air Force and German Luftwaffe’s fighter arm (Jagdwaffe). The aim of the American-led mission was a strategic bombing raid on ball bearing factories in order to reduce production of these vital parts for all manner of war machines. This was the second mission attacking the factories at Schweinfurt. American wartime intelligence claimed the first Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission in August had reduced bearing production by 34% but had suffered heavy losses. A planned follow-up raid had to be postponed to rebuild American forces. As the squadrons rebuilt, plans for the return mission were modified based on the lessons learned. Planners added additional fighter escorts to cover the outward and return legs of the operations, and sent the entire force against Schweinfurt alone, instead of splitting the force. Despite of these tactical modifications, a series of minor mishaps combined with the ever-increasing efficiency of the German anti-aircraft efforts proved to be devastating. Of the 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses sent on the mission, 60 were lost outright, another 17 damaged so heavily that they had to be scrapped, and another 121 had varying degrees of battle damage. Outright losses represented over 26% of the attacking force. Losses in aircrew were equally heavy, with 650 men lost of 2,900, 22% of the bomber crews. The American Official History of the Army Air Forces in the Second World War acknowledged losses had been so heavy that the USAAF would not return to the target for four months; “The fact was that the Eighth Air Force had for the time being lost air superiority over Germany”. The operation was a failure at all levels. The tactical-technological failure to produce a long-range escort exposed the bombers to unrelenting attacks by German fighters and the improper preparations for the creation of reserves in the summer, 1943, meant that current logsitics could not sustain such costly operations. The intelligence of the Allied Air Forces was also questionable calling into question the entire ball bearing strategy. Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding RAF Bomber Command refused to cooperate with the Americans, believing ball bearing targets to be a “panacea”.Post-war analysis has shown Harris’ objections to be correct. The Germans had built up enormous reserves of ball bearings and were receiving supplies from all over Europe, particularly Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. The operation against these industries would, even if successful, have achieved little. By 1945 the Germans had assembled more reserves than ever before. Factories in and around Schweinfurt accounted for a significant amount of German ball-bearing production. The Kugelfischer plant produced 22 percent, and the Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken I and II produced 20 percent, and another one percent came from the Fichtel & Sachs factory. After the German ball bearing “bottleneck” had been identified in 1942 and ball bearings had been named the second-most-vital Pointblank industry for the Combined Bomber Offensive in March 1943, Schweinfurt’s ball bearing plants were selected for a second air raid after being bombed during the August Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission. Each of the three bomber wings was to be escorted by fighters from a single group with multiple squadrons of P-47 Thunderbolts. The fighters were inexplicably not employing drop tanks which limited their escort range. One fighter outfit was sidetracked to escort a squadron of 29 B-24s that switched to a diversion mission to Emden because of the bad weather forecast. Some 229 of 291 B-17s hit the city area and ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt, Germany in two groups: the first group bombed at 1439–1445 hours, the second group at 1451–1457 hours. They claim 186-27-89 Luftwaffe aircraft. 60 B-17s are lost, two damaged beyond repair and 13 damaged; casualties are five KIA, 40 WIA and 594 MIA. In addition, the bomber formations were spread out and vulnerable because of bad weather. The Luftwaffe military intelligence officers had suspected a deep penetration air raid because of the substantial raids. Jagdgeschwader 3 Udet intercepted the bombers as they crossed the coast but P-47s succeeded in shooting down seven Bf 109s while losing just one P-47. Over the Netherlands elements of JG 1 Oesau and JG 26 Schlageter made repeated attacks. The 305th Bomb Group lost 13 of its 16 B-17s in minutes. The B-17s were attacked after bombing by fighters that had refueled and rearmed (JG 11 downed 18 B-17s). A total of 13 bombers were shot down by German fighters and flak and 12 bombers were damaged so badly that they crashed upon return or had to be scrapped. Another 121 bombers returned with moderate damage. Of 2,900 crewmen, about 254 men did not return (65 survived as prisoners-of-war), while five killed-in-action and 43 wounded were in the damaged aircraft that returned (594 were listed as missing-in-action). Among the American losses was the 306th Bomb Group. It lost 100 men: 35 died on the mission or of wounds and 65 were captured. The 305th Bomb Group lost 130 men (87%), with 36 killed. The bombing that day ranged from poor to spectacular but with the exception of the failure of the 2nd Bombardment Division at Danzig and Gdynia, bombing at all targets was of a high order. At Anklam the Arado factory, engaged in manufacturing components for the Fw 190s, suffered damage to virtually all its buildings. Damage to naval units and port facilities at Gdynia was also severe but it was at Marienburg that the most successful bombing was done. There the Focke-Wulf plant was almost completely destroyed by high-explosive and incendiary bombs dropped with unprecedented accuracy. Although at both Marienburg and Anklam the bombing was done at relatively low altitudes (11,000 to 14,000 ft), a tactic permitted by the surprise nature of this unexpectedly long flight, accuracy (especially at the former) was remarkable and was hailed by General Eaker as “the classic example of precision bombing”. Of the 598 x 500-pound GP bombs dropped over Marienburg, 286 were identified by aerial reconnaissance as having fallen within the factory area. Of these, at least 35 were direct hits on buildings. In addition to the destruction by high explosives, incendiary bombs caused major damage by fire, although their poor ballistic qualities prevented as fine a concentration of them as with the high explosives. This served to raise the general level of bombing accuracy, which had shown distinct improvement since the summer. In July 1943 the Eighth AF as a whole placed only 12.7 per cent of its bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and 36.7 per cent within 2,000 ft. In October these figures had been raised to 27.2 per cent and 53.8 per cent respectively. The change may be explained in part by the fact that the new bomber groups that arrived in May and June had become gradually more experienced. Bombardier training had received special emphasis in Europe and in the United States during the summer and early fall and had been recognized as the heart of the entire training program.


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